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GRID MODERNIZATION AND ENERGY POVERTY 
Shelley Welton* 
Grid modernization holds the alluring promise of rationalizing 
electricity pricing, saving consumers money, and improving 
environmental quality all at the same time. Yet, we have seen only 
limited and patchwork regulatory initiatives towards significant 
grid modernization in the United States. Outside of a few leading 
states, state energy regulators appear loath to embrace full-
throated versions of the project. This article argues that the under-
discussed problem of energy poverty in the United States is a 
critical contributing factor in the gap between grid 
modernization’s possibilities and our regulatory reality. Only by 
explicitly understanding how the issues of grid modernization and 
energy poverty intersect, and by coming up with creative ways to 
address the challenges created, can regulators gain the comfort 
they need to move forward with grid modernization reforms in the 
face of rising inequality and substantial energy poverty. To get at 
these connections, this Article utilizes a case study of New York 
State’s grid modernization efforts. As part of these efforts, 
regulators there have pursued an inclusive inquiry into how best to 
manage the ways in which grid modernization might have 
disparate impacts on lower-income consumers, producing some 
important early-stage lessons for emerging modernization efforts 






                                                
* Thank you to participants in the symposium for their helpful feedback on these 
ideas. Thanks as well to Kintéshia Scott and Meagan Diedolf for outstanding 
research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For those who care about efficiency and rationality, there is 
much to want to fix in U.S. electricity law. Aging infrastructure, 
nonsensical pricing structures, and worries over whether the grid 
and its markets—as currently designed—can facilitate necessary 
levels of renewable or carbon-free generation, are all pressing 
concerns.1 Fortunately, technological solutions to these problems 
abound, and companies peddling these wares are eager to engage 
in the project of “grid modernization.”2 This modernization effort 
may introduce into the grid a “smart meter” for every house, 
capable of providing real-time information on electricity 
consumption; a host of “smart appliances” to respond to this 
information; storage systems capable of saving excess renewable 
energy generation to be released at times of under-production, 
including electric vehicles to act as grid batteries when not in use; 
and a shift to “dynamic” pricing to incentivize consumers to utilize 
                                                
 1 See, e.g., Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in 
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016). 
 2 Some also use the term “smart grid” to describe a similar set of reforms. See 
Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). MIT’s thorough study on the future of the electric 
grid eschews any particular definition of “smart grid” in favor of defining the 
project of grid modernization as “making the grid of the future more resilient, 
secure, efficient and reliable amid a variety of emerging challenges.” MASS. 
INST. TECH. (MIT), THE FUTURE OF THE GRID: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT 
STUDY 20 (2011). 
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technologies to better manage the timing of their electricity 
demand.3 
For those who care about justice, current electricity governance 
also leaves much to be desired. In 2015, fourteen million U.S. 
households had unpaid utility bills, and 2.2 million had service 
disconnected.4 That means around 14% of U.S. households are 
either actively without energy services, or in danger of losing them 
imminently.5 Many of these families, and many others who 
manage to pay their bills on time but sacrifice other basic 
necessities to do so, spend an exorbitant and unsustainable portion 
of their monthly earnings on obtaining energy supplies, causing 
them to experience “energy poverty.”6 To add insult to injury, 
many of these same families are likely to be more severely harmed 
than wealthier Americans by the effects of climate change—
another inconvenient byproduct of our current energy 
infrastructure.7 
                                                
 3 See Eisen, supra note 2, at 19. Grid modernization also involves many 
larger-scale solutions, typically implemented or constructed by utilities. See 
infra Part I. 
 4 Tony Gerard Reames, Targeting Energy Justice: Exploring Spatial, 
Racial/Ethnic and Socioeconomic Disparities in Urban Residential Heating 
Energy Efficiency, 97 ENERGY POL’Y 549, 549 (2016). 
 5 This number was obtained by dividing Reames’ figures on households 
without energy services or behind on their utility bills, 16.2 million, by the U.S. 
Census total number of U.S. households, 117 million. See QuickFacts, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/HSD410215/00 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 6 See infra Part III. 
 7 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 
12 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report 
(“Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to the range of climate change 
related health impacts, including the elderly, children, the poor, and the sick.”); 
see also GEO. MASON U. CTR. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, RACE, ETHNICITY 
AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010). 
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Descriptions of Americans opening their ovens to stay warm in 
the winter8 appear a far cry from the cornucopia of technological 
wonders described in the first paragraph of this Article. Perhaps in 
part for this reason, grid modernization and energy poverty are 
rarely discussed in the same conversation, much less in the same 
sentence.9 Yet grid modernization—for all its anticipated 
substantial long-term benefits—requires substantial short-term 
spending, and carries both short- and long-term distributional 
consequences. Most decisions on how to modernize both 
infrastructure and regulatory frameworks are made by state 
electricity regulators, “nearly all [of whom] feel pressure or the 
desire to address the issue of affordability.10 For this reason, as the 
project of grid modernization substantially advances in many 
states, regulators no longer feel able to ignore its intersections with 
energy poverty. 
If fully carried out, the Department of Energy has suggested 
that the project of grid modernization “may transform America as 
much as the Internet has done, redefining every aspect of 
electricity generation, distribution, and use.”11 For a long time, the 
primary impediment to this transformation was technical—we 
simply did not have the infrastructure necessary to reform energy 
                                                
 8 See, e.g., Deadly Dangers of Using the Stove for Heat, METRO. TENANTS 
ORG. (Feb. 18, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://www.tenants-rights.org/deadly-dangers-
of-using-the-stove-for-heat/. 
 9 Although this measure is crude, one might also note that the two terms have 
never appeared together in a single law review article archived on Westlaw (as 
indicated by a January 2017 Westlaw search for the terms in the “Law Reviews 
and Journals” database). Cf. Karen Bickerstaff et al., Introduction: Making 
Sense of Energy Justice to ENERGY JUSTICE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: SOCIAL 
JUSTICE AND LOW-CARBON ENERGY 2 (Karen Bickerstaff et al. eds., 2013) 
(“[E]nergy justice is one of the most critical, and yet least developed, concepts 
associated with theories and practices of low-carbon transitions, and one that 
must underpin a sustainable energy future.”). 
 10 See SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, THE REDISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF NON-
LINEAR ELECTRICITY PRICING 35 (Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper No. 
204R, 2011), 
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/abstracts/abstract_wp204R.html 
[hereinafter Borenstein, Non-Linear Electricity Pricing]. 
 11 Eisen, supra note 2, at 6. 
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pricing and integrate new technologies. Now, however—thanks in 
large part to a significant amount of funding from the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act12—the necessary 
technology is in place in much of the country.13 
And yet, we have seen limited and patchwork regulatory 
initiatives towards significant grid modernization.14 Outside of a 
few leading states, state energy regulators appear loath to embrace 
full-throated versions of the project. Consumers, too, have proven 
wary about adopting putatively beneficial but unfamiliar energy 
management technologies and strategies.15 In light of these 
challenges, it seems clear that the major impediments to grid 
modernization are now firmly within the social and regulatory 
realms.16 
Many others have made this same observation in recent years.17 
They have propounded a list of hurdles holding us back from our 
grid modernizing potential, including conservatism on the part of 
utilities and regulators, challenges to utility profitability, concerns 
over increasing consumers’ electric bill volatility, and privacy 
concerns over the new mountains of consumption data that a 
modern grid might produce.18 This symposium article aims to make 
a modest addition to this conversation: In brief, it argues that the 
                                                
 12 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115 (2009); Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic 
Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 382 (2012) (“The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided about $5.0 billion 
for smart grid demonstration and technology deployment projects . . . .”). 
 13 See infra Part III. 
 14 Ahmad Faruqui, The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 13, 18 
(2010) (describing how some economists “believed that given the overwhelming 
efficiency benefits that would flow from dynamic pricing, it was inevitable that 
deployment of this optimal rate design would soon follow. But it did not.”). 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 Although, of course, it is difficult to establish “a clear and widely accepted 
border between what is considered to be unquestionably technical and what is 
recognized as unquestionably social.” MICHAEL CALLON ET AL., ACTING IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD: AN ESSAY ON TECHNICAL DEMOCRACY 25 (Graham 
Burchell trans., MIT 2001). 
 17 See infra Section II.B. 
 18 See id. 
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under-discussed problem of energy poverty in the United States is 
a critical contributing factor in the gap between grid 
modernization’s possibilities and our regulatory reality. Only by 
explicitly understanding how these issues intersect, and by coming 
up with creative ways to address the challenges created, can 
regulators gain the comfort they need to move forward with grid 
modernization reforms in the face of rising inequality and 
substantial energy poverty.19 
To get at these connections, this Article utilizes a case study of 
New York State’s grid modernization efforts. New York is at the 
forefront of efforts to dramatically redesign regulatory structures to 
incentivize a modernized grid, through a process referred to as 
“Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV).20 New York’s struggles 
with the problem of energy poverty during its REV proceedings 
illustrate the importance, challenges, and possibilities of explicitly 
linking energy poverty to grid modernization efforts. In addition, 
                                                
 19 Michael Dworkin and Benjamin Sovacool have been doing path-breaking 
work recently on defining the concept of “energy justice”—an endeavor 
certainly relevant here. My discussion here resonates with their broader thesis: 
“In sum, it is a mistake to talk about building infrastructure, improving energy 
security, developing energy resources, forecasting future energy demand, or 
conducting research on new technologies without first assessing energy justice: 
asking what this energy is for, what values and moral frameworks ought to guide 
us, and who benefits.” See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Michael H. Dworkin, 
Energy Justice: Conceptual Insights and Practical Applications, 142 APPLIED 
ENERGY 435, 441 (2015) [hereinafter Sovacool & Dworkin, Energy Justice]; see 
also generally BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL & MICHAEL H. DWORKIN, GLOBAL 
ENERGY JUSTICE: PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES (2014). However, the 
point here is less normative and more pragmatic: whether or not one thinks 
energy justice should be a central concern in grid modernization is not of central 
importance to me in this article. Instead, my argument is that simply as a matter 
of fact, energy poverty does matter to state energy regulators, such that progress 
on grid modernization depends on a willingness to consider its interaction with 
energy poverty and an ability to articulate a nuanced understanding of their 
tensions and synergies. Although the Author happens to share Dworkin and 
Sovacool’s normative outlook, even those who do not, might appreciate the 
more pragmatic version of the argument advanced here. 
 20 Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n in Regard to Reforming the Energy 
Vision, No. 14-M-0101 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter 
NYPSC Order Instituting Proceeding] (on file with author). 
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the Article contends, New York’s experience foretells the 
pressures that other states are likely to face as they proceed with 
announced plans of similarly ambitious reform agendas.21 
There is a significant risk that the challenges of grid 
modernization may splinter groups working on causes frequently 
cast together on the left: those struggling for a cleaner 
environment, and those struggling against persistent and deepening 
inequality. Such tensions have deep roots in the history of the 
environmental justice movement.22 Fresh fractures are emerging in 
                                                
 21 Numerous states are just at the cusp of substantially overhauling their 
outdated regulatory systems and grid infrastructure. See, e.g., Investigation by 
the Department of Public Utilities on its own Motion into Modernization of the 
Electric Grid, D.P.U. 12-76-B (Mass., June 12, 2014), 
http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/Attachments/Get/?path=12-
76%2FOrder_1276B.pdf; Nancy Lange et al., Building a Minnesota 
Conversation on Grid Modernization with a Focus on Distribution Systems, 
Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (Minn., May 12, 2015), 
http://mn.gov/puc/documents/pdf_files/ 
grid_modernization_5-12-2015.pdf; Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of 
Hawaii’s Electric Utilities, In the Matter of Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 314 PUB. 
UTILS. REPORTS 4TH 49 Exhibit A (Haw., Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
04/Commissions-Inclinations.pdf; KRISTIN RALFF DOUGLAS, CUSTOMERS AS 
GRID PARTICIPANTS: A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW ROLE FOR CUSTOMERS 3 (CAL. 
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, POL’Y & PLANNING DIV., May 15, 2013); Proposed 
Decision on Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to 
Conduct a Comprehensive Examination of Investor Owned Electric Utilities’ 
Residential Rate Structures, the Transition to Time Varying and Dynamic Rates, 
and Other Statutory Obligations, Rulemaking 12-06-013 (Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter California Rulemaking], 
http://www.sandiegocan.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Revised-Final-
Decision.pdf; Herman K. Trabish, Confidence in Collaboration: Rhode Island 
Targets a Common Perspective on DER Values, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 
confidence-in-collaboration-rhode-island-targets-a-common-perspective-on-d/42 
5700/; Robert Walton, Maryland’s REV: How Utility Regulators Plan to Tackle 
Business Model, DER Reforms, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 10, 2016), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/marylands-rev-how-utility-regulators-plan-to-
tackle-business-model-der-r/427681/. 
 22 See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, & REGULATION 3–5 (Carolina Academic Press) (2002). 
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many places across the country, as those in favor of policies 
promoting rooftop solar confront suggestions that such policies 
favor wealthier homeowners who can afford an appropriate perch 
for such panels at the expense of other ratepayers.23 
However, New York offers an antidote to such tales: there, 
environmentalists and social justice organizers have staunchly 
stood together, insisting in joint filings that their causes not be 
parsed, nor pitted against one another.24 New York’s Commission 
has listened, responding with a combination of enhanced bill 
protections and more inclusive REV policies.25 In sum, the New 
York example offers at least three important lessons to other states. 
First, merely emphasizing the potential wonders of grid 
modernization—including its potential economic upsides—is 
unlikely to sufficiently allay the fears of those most desperately 
struggling to maintain electricity under current policies. Separately 
protecting the most vulnerable remains a priority for many 
regulators and community members. Second, those worried about 
energy poverty no longer want it addressed as a stand-alone issue, 
considered apart from efforts towards renewable energy, new 
technologies, or addressing climate change.26 Instead, there 
emerged from New York’s proceedings an insistent refrain that 
energy poverty concerns “should not be viewed in isolation from 
the [REV] and related proceedings.”27 Third, process matters: New 
                                                
 23 Krysti Shallenberger, 10 Rooftop Solar Debates to Watch in 2017 and 
Beyond, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/10-
rooftop-solar-debates-to-watch-in-2017-and-beyond/435070/ (In 2015, there 
were 175 debates over rooftop solar policies in the U.S. . . . In 2016, there were 
212. And this year, those numbers are expected to rise yet again . . . .). A 
separate, similar debate exists in California over the advisability of addressing 
climate change through “cap-and-trade” policies, which environmental justice 
advocates suggest create hot-spots that harm low-income communities. See Lara 
J. Cushing et al., A Preliminary Environmental Equity Assessment Of 
California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, USCDORNSIFE (Sept. 2016), 
http://dornsife.usc.edu/PERE/enviro-equity-CA-cap-trade. 
 24 See infra Part IV. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 COMMENTS TO NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, 
PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE COMMISSION TO EXAMINE PROGRAMS TO 
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York’s relatively successful integration of energy poverty 
alleviation and grid modernization policies has engaged a 
considerably wider-than-normal group of stakeholder participants, 
through a substantial commitment of regulators’ time and effort.28 
This Article is organized as follows: Parts I through III give a 
brief overview of grid modernization and energy poverty as 
separate topics. Part IV delves into the story of how New York 
accommodated the marriage of these two issues in its ambitious 
REV process, and Part V draws some lessons from its experience 
to inform other emerging state forays into grid modernization. 
I. THE PROMISE OF GRID MODERNIZATION 
It is “easy enough to make the case for smart grid 
development.”29 There are many wondrous benefits that grid 
modernization might bring—not least of which is the potential 
alleviation of energy poverty. This section briefly reviews the 
many reasons the project of grid modernization deserves all the 
attention it has recently received, and more. This discussion is 
short because many authors have chronicled these benefits at 
considerably greater length.30 
In its most capacious usage, “grid modernization” refers to two 
sets of interlocking projects and objectives: modernizing 
“antiquated” portions of the grid and expanding the grid where 
                                                                                                         
ADDRESS ENERGY AFFORDABILITY FOR LOW INCOME UTILITY CUSTOMERS, NO. 
14-M-0565, at 3–4 (N.Y.P.S.C., Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter NYPSC Comments 
to Low Income Staff Report] (on file with author). 
 28 See infra Part IV. 
 29 Cf. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network 
Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 833, 861 (2010) (noting consistent with my introductory remarks, 
that it is “easy enough to make the case for smart grid development,” but 
“harder to lay out a plan for its actual deployment in any specific region or 
jurisdiction”). 
 30 See generally Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2; Quinn 
& Reed, supra note 29; Eisen, supra note 2; PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART 
POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, & THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES (2010); GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN 
AMERICANS AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE (2016). 
574 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
necessary;31 and “providing consumers with dramatic new ways to 
make, use, and conserve electricity.”32 The first project, grid 
retooling, focuses largely on upgrades to utility-owned equipment 
and services—such as investments in new transmission 
infrastructure, voltage support devices, and network monitoring 
systems.33 The second project—opening up the electricity grid to 
consumer-side participation—requires both technological 
investment and substantial recalibration of social relations around 
electricity. Consumers must be given the tools and knowledge to 
become “participants” in the electric grid.34 
Smart meter deployment is critical to this transition.35 These 
meters record electricity consumption in granular detail, so that 
                                                
 31 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2, at 7 (noting the grid is 
often referred to as “antiquated,” although taking some issue with the 
characterization). 
 32 Eisen, supra note 2, at 3; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 17381–17386 (2007) (“Statement of Policy on the Modernization 
of Electricity Grid”). See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2, at 
11–12; Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 29, 40 (2012). MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON GRID 
MODERNIZATION 1–2 (Mar. 2016), http://morethansmart.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/MNPUC_Staff_Report_on_Grid_Modernization_Marc
h2016.pdf. (“A modernized grid assures continued safe, reliable, and resilient 
utility network operations, and enables Minnesota to meet its energy policy 
goals, including the integration of variable renewable electricity sources and 
distributed energy resources. An integrated, modern grid provides for greater 
system efficiency and greater utilization of grid assets, enables the development 
of new products and services, provides customers with necessary information 
and tools to enable their energy choices, and supports a standards-based and 
interoperable utility network.”). 
 33 See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2, at 31-52 
(describing these technologies in detail). 
 34 See Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, U. COLO. L. REV., 14 
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Welton, Clean Electrification] (describing state 
movement towards a “participatory grid”); see also, e.g., Douglas, supra note 
21, at 3 (“Customer participation, more than the actions of the utilities or of the 
regulators, is critical to meet California’s greenhouse gas emission goals in a 
cost-effective manner.”). 
 35 Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and 
the Smart Grid, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 200 (2012) [hereinafter 
Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources] (“Price signals cannot be made available 
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one can measure changes in consumption throughout the day.36 As 
of late 2016, utilities and other grid operators had installed 57.1 
million of these meters in approximately 49% of U.S. households 
(and an additional 7.3 million in businesses and industrial 
operations).37 Smart meters allow utilities to better understand the 
ebb and flow of consumer electricity demand, creating the 
possibility of smarter programs to manage consumer demand 
during periods of grid stress.38 More profoundly, smart meter 
installation allows for the implementation of a reform long touted 
by economists and scholars of utility regulation: a transition from 
flat-fee, per-kilowatt-hour payments39 to more “dynamic” forms of 
pricing. Under dynamic pricing, the price that end-use consumers 
pay reflects the price that electricity actually costs to generate, 
which fluctuates considerably throughout the day.40 
                                                                                                         
to consumers without investments in advanced ‘smart meters’ and other systems 
to support them.”). 
 36 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=108&t=3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2017) 
[hereinafter USEIA] (“Advanced metering infrastructure includes meters that 
measure and record electricity usage at a minimum of hourly intervals and that 
provide the data to both the utility and the utility customer at least once a day. 
AMI installations range from basic hourly interval meters to real-time meters 
with built-in two-way communication that is capable of recording and 
transmitting instantaneous data.”). 
 37 This statistic was obtained by dividing the Energy Information 
Administration’s reported number of residential smart meter installations – 57.1 
million – by the U.S. Census Bureau’s latest statistics regarding the number of 
U.S. households – 117 million. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., An Assessment of 
Interval Data and Their Potential Application to Residential Electricity End-Use 
Modeling 3 (Feb. 2015); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5. 
 38 United States Energy Information Administration, supra note 37; Mike 
Faden, “Smart-Grid” Appliances, 6 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T 62, 
62 (2008). 
 39 See Joshua A. Blonz, Making the Best of the Second-Best: Welfare 
Consequences of Time-Varying Electricity Prices 1 (Energy Inst. at Haas, 
Working Paper No. 275, 2016). 
 40 See generally Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-
In Residential Dynamic Electricity Pricing, 42 REV. INDUS. ORG. 127, 127 
(2013) [hereinafter Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing] (“Economists who 
study electricity markets are virtually unanimous in arguing that time-varying 
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“Dynamic” pricing can take several forms. Real-time pricing 
links retail rates directly to the wholesale price of electricity.41 
Other less drastic options include time-of-use rates, which employ 
several different pricing levels for different times of day; and 
critical peak pricing, which prices certain particularly expensive 
hours much higher (generally 100–200 hours per year).42 It is 
generally believed that altering retail prices might be one of the 
most efficient, effective ways to motivate the kinds of consumer 
participation that smart grid proponents hope to achieve.43 With 
dynamic pricing in place, consumers would have concrete 
economic incentives to invest in the range of technologies 
previewed in the Introduction, including solar panels; “smart” 
thermostats; dishwashers, washers, and dryers capable of starting 
                                                                                                         
retail pricing for electricity would improve the efficiency of electricity systems 
and would lower the overall cost of meeting electricity demand.”); Joskow, 
supra note 32, at 32 (showing graph of fluctuations in New England’s real-time 
energy prices on a single day). Dynamic pricing’s benefits have long been 
understood—“[a study from] the late 1970s produced over 100 reports that 
outlined why dynamic pricing was important and described how it could be 
achieved.” Theresa Flaim et al., Pilot Paralysis: Why Dynamic Pricing Remains 
Over-Hyped and Underachieved, 26(4) ELECTRICITY J. 8, 8 (2013). See also 
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); Stephen 
Buryk et al., Investigating Preferences for Dynamic Electricity Tariffs: The 
Effect of Environmental and System Benefit Disclosure, 80 ENERGY POL’Y 190, 
190 (2015); FOX-PENNER, supra note 30, at 49. 
 41 See Blonz, supra note 39, at 1. 
 42 See id. at 1–2; Eisen, supra note 2, at 19. Critical peak pricing programs are 
the most common form of dynamic pricing programs in the United States at 
present. Blonz, supra note 39, at 2; see also Zheng Hu et al., Review of Dynamic 
Pricing Programs in the U.S. and Europe: Status Quo and Policy 
Recommendations, 42 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV’S 743 (2015). 
 43 See generally Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 12, at 381–82 (tracing the 50-
year history of the theory of dynamic pricing); Blonz, supra note 39, at I 
(explaining how flat rates “lead[] to overconsumption during peak periods, 
requiring the construction of excess generation capacity compared to first-best 
prices that adjust at short time intervals to reflect changing marginal cost” and 
finding that well-constructed time-of-use rates could produce significant welfare 
gains); see also Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 871. 
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and stopping in response to changes in electricity pricing; electric 
vehicles; and rooftop storage systems.44 
Grid modernization holds potential efficienct, environmental, 
and social gains. In its fullest instantiation, it might create 
“spectacular technological breakthroughs, the rise of entire new 
industries, and consumer uses far beyond anyone’s wildest 
dreams.”45 Although likely to impose significant up-front expenses, 
many experts predict that investments in grid modernizing 
technologies will ultimately save society considerable money, as 
an updated “grid would ‘operate more efficiently, would need less 
maintenance and large-scale infrastructural investment, and would 
fall victim to fewer ‘power disturbances” such as outages and 
overloads that impose significant costs on the U.S. economy.’”46 
Additionally, the modernization of equipment and integration of 
consumer-side offerings is likely to prove critical in the U.S. effort 
to transition to greater reliance on renewable energy.47 Because 
renewables operate “intermittently,” when the sun shines or the 
wind blows, integrating them in high quantities is much easier if 
there is an ability to respond rapidly to shifts in supply with near-
                                                
 44 Eisen, supra note 2, at 10–11; Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 871 (“To 
this end, these efforts would be best supported by technologies that provide 
targeted, real-time information to electricity customers, and measured usage in 
relatively small time slices so that electricity consumers are aware of specific 
appliance loads and can react in an informed way to either price signals or 
environmental directives and information.”). 
 45 Eisen, supra note 2, at 3. Some envision that a smart grid might ultimately 
allow consumers to contract directly with producers of electricity, such that you 
could pick to buy your produce and your wind from the same trusted farmer 
down the road. See Matthew Crosby, An Airbnb or Uber for the Electricity 
Grid?, RMI BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_09_02_an_airbnb_or_uber_for_the_electricity_gr
id. 
 46 Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 837. 
 47 Twenty-nine U.S. states have “renewable portfolio standards” in place that 
aim to promote enhanced reliance on renewable energy sources in the coming 
decades. See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY 
(DSIRE), RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES (Feb. 2017), 
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Renewa 
ble-Portfolio-Standards_Feb2017.pdf. 
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contemporaneous shifts in demand.48 A modernized grid could 
enable precisely this type of quick-fire management of electricity 
demand.49 At the same time, by empowering greater potential 
demand reductions, grid modernization would help “avoid 
unnecessary expenses of building new generation, transmission, 
and distribution infrastructure.”50 In addition, grid modernization 
may hold much-vaunted job-creating potential, as it will provide 
opportunities for new companies to emerge and situate themselves 
as “energy managers” for consumers who have limited inclination 
to invest their own time and resources in grid participation.51 
II. GETTING THERE: ROLES AND IMPEDIMENTS 
To extol the virtues of a modern grid invites the question of 
why we all are not already boasting the suite of high-tech gadgets 
previewed above, or receiving monthly “negative bills” from our 
energy management companies detailing the amount of energy 
savings they have earned us in the last month (after subtracting out 
their cut of these savings, naturally). Grid modernization, as a 
theory, has been around a long while, and yet the future it portends 
still feels at least marginally in the realm of science fiction, rather 
than reality. 
                                                
 48 Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 838; Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, 
supra note 35, at 195. 
 49 See Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 130 
(“Dynamic pricing makes it possible to match more closely demand fluctuations 
to the exogenous supply fluctuations and, thus, reduce the system costs of 
integrating these renewable energy sources.”); Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 
838; Buryk et al., supra note 40, at 191. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission has estimated that demand response programs, aimed at cutting 
demand during peak periods, could eliminate about 8.7% of U.S. peak demand. 
See Flaim et al., supra note 40, at 9. 
 50 Eisen, supra note 2, at 12. See generally Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission 
Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (2015); Elec. Power Research Inst. 
(EPRI), The Green Grid: Energy Savings and Carbon Emissions Reductions 
Enabled by a Smart Grid., No. 1016905, 1–3 (2008), 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/The_Green_ 
Grid_Energy_Savings_Carbon_Emission_Reduction_En_200812.pdf. 
 51 See Eisen, supra note 2, at 12. 
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As with the task of envisioning and defining grid 
modernization, many scholars have taken us a long way towards 
understanding why grid modernization has been such a slow 
process. This part summarizes their research regarding reasons for 
delay, almost all of which fall within the realm of social or 
regulatory—rather than technical—impediments. Because the 
impediments are chiefly of this variety, it is necessary to explain in 
a bit more detail the regulatory role in grid modernization before 
chronicling its challenges. 
A. The Regulatory Role in Grid Modernization 
Decades after the “deregulation” of many major U.S. 
industries,52 energy regulation continues to be relatively heavy-
handed. There are good reasons for this heavy-handedness: unlike 
most products, electricity requires perfect, second-by-second 
balancing between quantities of electricity being supplied into the 
grid, and quantities of electricity being drawn out of it.53 Without 
constant monitoring, the electricity grid would cease to function, 
and blackouts would become the norm.54 
Moreover, the prevailing U.S. sentiment is that electricity is a 
modern necessity that should be made available to every American 
willing and able to pay for it.55 This sentiment is instantiated in the 
regulatory structure of every U.S. state, in which a “Public Utility 
Commission” (“PUC”) oversees monopoly electric utilities. In 
exchange for being granted an exclusive service area, these utilities 
agree to supply all residents of that area with electricity at PUC-
determined “just and reasonable” rates.56 Included in these rates are 
the utilities’ costs of generating or purchasing electric power, as 
                                                
 52 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998). 
 53 See Joskow, supra note 32, at 31–33. 
 54 Right now, the grid does not have significant storage capacity to smooth out 
differences in supply and demand, although the development of greater storage 
capacity may help alleviate this problem in the future. See Joskow, supra note 
32, at 36. 
 55 See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34, at 107. 
 56 See id. at 111; see also 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 3 (1988). 
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well as their costs of constructing the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure necessary to move electricity to customers.57 
PUCs thus have a significant role to play in determining how 
grid modernization unfolds. For those expenses that utilities will 
incur—including upgrades to the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure—PUCs have to decide whether or not to allow 
utilities to recoup the costs from their customers as part of “just 
and reasonable” rates.58 Similarly, PUCs play a prominent role in 
deciding whether or not to move customers towards any forms of 
“dynamic pricing.”59 PUCs are also responsible for figuring out 
how to compensate distributed energy technologies that consumers 
might deploy to supply extra power to the grid, such as rooftop 
solar panels.60 For all of these reasons, PUCs have become the 
locus of substantial societal contestation over grid modernization. 
In these contests, they have embraced modernization only half-
heartedly and often reluctantly, for reasons that are the focus of the 
remainder of this article. 
                                                
 57 In providing this short summary of state regulatory structures, this Article 
necessarily glosses over some significant disparities among various states in the 
country. For a thorough explanation of the flavors of state electricity regulation, 
and how this basic structure has evolved in many states over time, see William 
Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy 
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016). 
 58 See Eisen, supra note 2, at 17; see also, e.g., In re Baltimore Gas & Elec., 
101 Md. P.S.C. 149, at 6 (Md. P.S.C., June 21, 2010) (Authorization to Deploy a 
Smart Grid Initiative and to Establish a Surcharge for the Recovery of Cost) 
(rejecting utility’s application for a smart grid program in part because the 
Commission was “persuaded that some of the Company’s most vulnerable 
residential customers . . . are less likely to realize the potential benefits of [time-
of-use] pricing than would the ‘average’ residential customer”). 
 59 For discussion of the various forms of dynamic pricing, see supra note 42. 
 60 See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34, at 20–25; see also Sanya 
Carley & Lincoln L. Davies, Nevada’s Net Energy Metering Experience: The 
Making of a Policy Eclipse?, BROOKINGS MOUNTAIN WEST (2016), 
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=br
ookings_pubs. 
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B. Well-Documented Challenges 
This article is far from the first to observe that social 
impediments—rather than technical—form the chief barrier to grid 
modernization. This subpart briefly summarizes the research that 
has been done to date on reasons why grid modernization is 
proceeding more slowly than its proponents might desire, or 
economic theory might predict.61 These challenges might be 
grouped into two broad categories: (1) misaligned utility and 
regulatory incentives, and (2) individual cognitive and behavioral 
barriers. 
Joel Eisen suggests that one key challenge facing grid 
modernization is the inherent conservatism of utilities and state 
PUCs. Given PUCs’ mandate to maintain “just and reasonable 
rates,” these institutions shy away from allowing utilities to 
recover from consumers any infrastructure investments that do not 
provide clear and imminent economic gains to consumers.62 
However, the benefits of grid modernization may not be apparent 
or certain until a whole suite of presently non-existent technologies 
and changes come into place—not just infrastructure investments 
and advanced metering installation, but the emergence of new 
companies, technologies, and pricing structures to respond to these 
advancements.63 For this reason, PUCs have expressed skepticism 
about the cost-benefit tradeoff of asking customers to fund the 
early utility-side infrastructure necessary to enable a full-throated 
version of grid modernization.64 
Similar skepticism exists around significant changes to current 
electricity pricing. “At the residential level, time-varying pricing 
has gotten very little traction in any form.”65 Opt-in schemes are 
unpopular with consumers, and few state regulators are willing to 
                                                
 61 See Joskow, supra note 32, at 40. 
 62 Eisen, supra note 2, at 17. 
 63 See supra Part I. 
 64 See Eisen, supra note 2, at 17; Joskow, supra note 32, at 15. 
 65 Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 127–28 
(“[T]ime-varying retail electricity pricing is very popular with economists, but 
has little support among regulators and consumers.”). 
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require mandatory or even default dynamic pricing regimes.66 This 
hesitance is due in part to worries that consumers will not 
understand or appropriately utilize new pricing structures.67 
However, Catherine Wolfram and Paul Joskow argue that evidence 
from recent pilot experiments suggests quite the opposite: a 
substantial portion of customers in many pilots understand and 
respond to differentials in electricity prices over time.68 For this 
reason, they suggest that “[t]he fear of large redistributions across 
customers is possibly the largest impediment to further adoption of 
dynamic pricing.”69 That is to say, regulators are most worried 
about those who will not respond to dynamic pricing, and thus see 
their bills go up.70 
A few scholars have tackled the question of precisely whose 
bills might rise under dynamic pricing with mixed results. Some 
find that low-income households are not systematically 
disadvantaged by dynamic pricing, while others have found cause 
for concern.71 The following sections contextualize the importance 
                                                
 66 California is poised to become the first state to create default time-of-use 
rates, which should become active in 2019. See California Rulemaking, supra 
note 21, at 1; Laurie Guevara-Stone, California Flattens Rate Blocks, Rolls Out 
Default Time-Of-Use Pricing, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. BLOG (Jun. 5, 2015), 
http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2015_06_05_california_flattens_rate_blocks_rolls_out_
default_time_of_use_pricing. 
 67 Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 12, at 383; see also, Borenstein, Dynamic 
Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 137. 
 68 Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 12, at 383. 
 69 Id. at 384. 
 70 See id. at 384 
 71 See Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 144–45 
(collecting sources on both sides of this debate and finding in his own study that 
low-income consumers would not benefit substantially, although most would see 
only small bill changes); see also Flaim et al., supra note 40, at 18 (finding that 
control technologies are important in being able to respond to dynamic pricing); 
Faruqui, supra note 14, at 21–22 (suggesting that low-income consumers might 
on the whole benefit from a shift to dynamic pricing); Frank A. Felder, The 
Equity Implications of Smart Grid: Questioning the Size and Distribution of 
Smart Grid Costs and Benefits, in SMART GRID: INTEGRATING RENEWABLE, 
DISTRIBUTED AND EFFICIENT ENERGY 85, 88 (2012) (“There is nothing close to 
a majority view, let alone a near consensus, that these technologies should be 
adopted.”); William W. Hogan, Fairness and Dynamic Pricing: Comments, 
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of this mixed evidence, observing that these inconclusive empirics 
present substantial concerns to regulators. 
Utilities, for their part, have obvious self-preservation instincts 
that may conflict with the project of grid modernization. Some of 
the investments required to modernize the grid might benefit 
utilities’ bottom line, by allowing them to invest in new 
infrastructure on which they earn a PUC-established “rate of 
return.”72 But at the same time, “traditional rate-of-return 
regulation creates incentives in many ways antithetical to the 
modern project of electricity reform.”73 Efforts to cut consumers’ 
energy demand and allow them to self-generate a portion of their 
electricity needs cuts against utilities’ core business—the selling of 
electricity.74 For this reason, utilities may hesitate to promote many 
components of grid modernization, and may actively argue against 
their adoption by state regulators.75 
On the other side of the meter, even though consumers stand to 
benefit considerably in the long run from grid modernization, 
many of our human instincts impede us from getting to that point. 
The costs of getting set up with all the gadgetry necessary to 
                                                                                                         
23(6) ELECTRICITY J. 28, 29 (2010) (arguing that “existing tariff designs with 
constant prices already embed distributional consequences”). See also Welton, 
Clean Electrification, supra note 34 (gathering evidence on both sides of this 
debate). 
 72 Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 873. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Quinn and Reed observe that certain technologies—including advanced 
metering and home automation for time-shifting of demand—might “reduce 
costs while otherwise maintaining existing sales levels,” but argue that on the 
whole, smart grid technologies are likely to harm utilities’ profitability. Id. 
 75 Id. at 873–74; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for 
You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1527 1544–45 (2012). One prominent example of utility 
resistance emerges in the battles over state net metering policies, which are 
under assault in dozens of states across the country. Utilities dislike these 
policies because they promote rooftop solar via generous buy-back policies for 
solar panel owners, causing utilities to lose customer revenue. See Welton, 
Clean Electrification, supra note 34. 
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“participate” in the modern grid76 are substantial, both in terms of 
time and money.77 And the gadgets themselves aren’t exactly 
trendy must-haves—as Eisen has observed, “[n]o one is standing in 
line at an Apple Store for a smart thermostat78 Nor is it clear 
whether and how consumers might access all the data that smart 
meters’ provide about their individualized use, as state laws 
regarding this data remain unsatisfactory or inconclusive on this 
point.79 All of which leaves consumers—similarly to regulators—
hesitant to move first in adopting grid modernization technologies, 
or to opt into any variety of dynamic pricing that might increase 
the volatility of their bills.80 
Consumers have expressed a separate, substantial worry with 
grid modernization that can only be partially attributed to cognitive 
failings: that of consumer privacy. In brief, the concern is that 
advanced meters, with their near-constant monitoring of household 
electricity usage, may give regulators and utilities a new world of 
information about how we each live our wired-in lives “within the 
                                                
 76 See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34 (chronicling state efforts 
to create a “participatory” grid). 
 77 Eisen, supra note 2, at 15; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, 
Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of Energy Consumption Data, 104 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1095, 1108–09 (2016). 
 78 Eisen, supra note 2, at 15. 
 79 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 77, at 1100, 1105 (arguing that “the 
inability of municipalities, energy efficiency providers, and customers to easily 
obtain energy consumption data in a standardized format excludes them from 
participating in energy markets, evaluating different rate pricing schemes, and 
understanding the value of energy investments” and suggesting that state PUCs 
have by and large been slow to mandate standards for consumer interface with 
this data). 
 80 Buryk et al., supra note 40, at 191 (finding that in “opt-in” dynamic pricing 
pilots, only between 5% and 28% of persons asked were successfully recruited 
to participate); Flaim et al., supra note 40, at 8 (“Despite the recent resurgence 
of pilots and field trials, dynamic pricing at the retail level remains limited.”); 
Eisen, supra note 2, at 19–20; Blonz, supra note 39, at 5 (“Some customers 
would face significantly higher energy bills under real-time pricing, creating a 
constituency opposed to the new pricing system.”). 
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putative privacy of the home.”81 What might be revealed? Such 
details as: 
When you turn off the lights. When you take a shower. When 
you leave home. Where your electric vehicle is being charged . . . 
[I]f the security system is activated, if one cooks with a microwave 
or the stove, the presence of certain medical equipment, how much 
and when the household watches television . . . .82 
Largely in response to these concerns, some PUCs are allowing 
consumers “to refuse to be fitted with a smart meter if they do not 
want one—for whatever reason.”83 
All of these concerns are important elements of understanding 
why the grid modernization project is going slower than expected 
in many places. Nevertheless, this list ignores one important 
additional impediment: that of regulators’ substantial concerns 
over protecting those consumers experiencing “energy poverty.” 
III. UNDERSTANDING ENERGY POVERTY 
When most people hear the term energy poverty, they think of 
faraway places: women forced to walk hours to gather firewood 
bundles that they lug home to cook with, villages with spotty or no 
access to electricity, or cook stoves filling small huts with 
dangerous emissions.84 These are, to be sure, substantial and 
                                                
 81 See Kevin L. Doran, Privacy and Smart Grid: When Progress and Privacy 
Collide, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 909, 910 (2010); see also Eisen, supra note 2, at 16. 
See generally Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 199 (2011); Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart 
Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (2011); Samuel J. Harvey, Smart Meters, 
Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and Innovation in the Electric Grid, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 2068 (2014). 
 82 Balough, supra note 81, at 161, 167. 
 83 ELECTRICITY, Dynamic Pricing, supra note 63, at 6 (emphasis in original) 
(explaining that California has taken this step). Some consumers also worry 
about electromagnetic fields (“EMF”) created by smart meters, and their 
potential to induce headaches, nausea, and other physical symptoms. See id. 
 84 See, e.g., Fatih Birol, Energy Economics: A Place for Energy Poverty in the 
Agenda?, 28 ENERGY J. 1, 2–4 (2007); UNITED NATIONS, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 
FOR ALL: AN OVERVIEW 1, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/ 
SEFA.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); Christian E. Casillas & Daniel M. 
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pressing problems. “Today, 1.6 billion people in developing 
countries do not have access to electricity in their homes.”85 And 
“2.5 billion people—40% of the world’s population—rely on 
traditional biomass such as wood, agricultural residues and dung to 
meet virtually all of their cooking energy needs.”86 
But energy poverty is not a problem confined to developing 
countries. Although different in degree if not kind, the energy 
poverty challenges facing U.S. families remain substantial 
impediments to fulfilling basic human and social needs,87 and stand 
as a reproach to the long-standing aim of enabling all Americans to 
access affordable electricity.88 
Scholars are just beginning to grapple with the concept of 
energy poverty in the United States,89 and definitional problems 
                                                                                                         
Kammen, The Energy-Poverty-Climate Nexus, 330 SCI. 1181 (Nov. 2010); 
Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Political Economy of Energy Poverty: A Review of 
Key Challenges, 16 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 272, 273 (2012) 
[hereinafter Sovacool, Energy Poverty] (“[T]he UNDP explicitly defines energy 
poverty as the ‘inability to cook with modern cooking fuels and the lack of a 
bare minimum of electric lighting to read or for other household and productive 
activities at sunset.’” (quoting AMIE GAYE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2007/2008, ACCESS TO ENERGY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 4 (2007))). 
 85 Birol, supra note 84, at 3. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, Affordability, and Energy Justice 
in England: Policy Insights from the Warm Front Program, 93 ENERGY 361, 
361 (2012) [hereinafter Sovacool, Fuel Poverty] (“Though many may take it for 
granted, having a warm, comfortable, well-lit home is an instrumental part of 
modern, industrialized life.”); Diana Hernández, Sacrifice Along the Energy 
Continuum: A Call for Energy Justice, 8 ENVTL. JUST. 151, 154 (“Whereas 
infrastructure presents the most significant barrier to energy in the poorer 
nations, the circumstances surrounding energy justice in industrialized nations 
are more nuanced.”). 
 88 See Welton, supra note 34 (chronicling how this aim has manifested itself 
throughout the history of U.S. electricity policy). 
 89 Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 361 (arguing that “the topic of 
fuel poverty and vulnerability . . . is all too often ignored in contemporary 
energy policy discussions”). The European Union, and the United Kingdom in 
particular, are considerably further along in their discussion of energy poverty 
and in developing policy responses to address it. See Ralitsa Petrova Hiteva, 
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plague the field.90 In basic terms, energy poverty—also often 
referred to as fuel poverty or energy insecurity91—is “the inability 
of households to afford energy services for adequate heating and 
cooling resulting in uncomfortable indoor temperatures, material 
deprivation, and accumulated utility debt.”92 But of course, 
electricity affords more than just livable temperatures in our 
modern world—it is also essential for forming and maintaining 
social connections, knowledge, and cultural capital.93 
                                                                                                         
Fuel Poverty and Vulnerability in the EU Low-Carbon Transition: The Case of 
Renewable Electricity, 18 LOC. ENV’T 487 (2013). 
 90 Sovacool, Energy Poverty, supra note 84, at 273 (“As there is no simple 
definition of poverty, conceptualizing ‘energy poverty’ is a somewhat arduous 
process.”). 
 91 Many researchers use the terms “energy poverty” and “fuel poverty” as 
synonyms. See, e.g., Reames, supra note 4, at 549; Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, 
supra note 87, at 362 (describing his work as “center[ing] the discussion of fuel 
poverty not only on traditional notions of affordability or household energy 
poverty, but also on novel notions of energy justice, ethics, and recognition”); 
Conor Harrison & Jeff Popke, “Because You Got to Have Heat”: The 
Networked Assemblage of Energy Poverty in Eastern North Carolina, 101 
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 949, 950 (2011). Others treat them as 
overlapping but not necessarily synonymous concepts. See Kang Li et al., 
Energy Poor or Fuel Poor: What Are the Differences?, 68 ENERGY POL’Y 476–
81 (2014); Hiteva, supra note 89, at 492 (“[V]ariations exist in the way fuel 
poverty is defined and the contexts within which it is sometimes interchangeably 
used with the term energy poverty or distinguished from it.”). This Article treats 
the concepts synonymously, and uses “energy poverty” throughout. However, 
readers should take note that the terms do not have clearly delineated meanings, 
and alternative phrasings exist. See Rosie Day & Gordon Walker, Household 
Energy Vulnerability as ‘Assemblage,’ in ENERGY JUSTICE IN A CHANGING 
CLIMATE, supra note 9, at 14 (“Partly because research and policy attention has 
emerged in a quite differentiated manner, different languages have been 
employed to characterize the problem that is at issue, including those of fuel 
poverty, energy poverty, energy insecurity, energy deprivation and energy 
precariousness.”). 
 92 Reames, supra note 4, at 549; Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362 
(reporting that inadequately heated housing results in “higher rates of mortality 
among the elderly, a greater prevalence of circulatory and respiratory diseases in 
adults, reduced physical and emotional well-being, and an increased risk of falls, 
mental health illness, social isolation, and hospital admissions”). 
 93 To understand this assertion, imagine what life would look like without 
your cell phone, computer, access to the internet or at least cable news, or the 
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How can one know whether someone is suffering from energy 
poverty? There is partial but incomplete overlap between 
Americans in general poverty and the group experiencing energy 
poverty specifically.94 “Poverty” is typically defined by reference 
to a particular income level.95 Energy poverty, in contrast, is 
defined specifically in terms of a household’s ability to maintain a 
comfortable standard of existence in their home.96 Those 
researchers most carefully theorizing energy poverty tend to resist 
the tendency to describe it in quantifiable terms, preferring instead 
to view it as “contingent,” “multidimensional in character and 
produced through the coming together of social, technological, and 
natural processes.”97 Often, though, as a practical matter, the 
delineation of this contingent condition turns on the amount of 
money a family must put specifically towards energy services each 
month or year.98 When quantified, “energy poverty” is typically 
defined by a measure of a household’s “energy burden,” which is 
the percentage of income spent on energy.99 Measuring energy 
burdens proves a useful way to disaggregate general poverty and 
energy poverty, because: 
Some people are poor but can afford adequate warmth. 
Others with incomes above the accepted poverty line 
nevertheless cannot afford to be warm—because their 
home is difficult or expensive to heat. There are also people 
                                                                                                         
ability to pick up a book, magazine, or newspaper before sunrise or after sunset. 
Electricity, simply put, is the oft-hidden thread that binds together the fabric of 
modern American society. 
 94 See Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362. 
 95 See How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/poverty-measu 
res.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2016). 
 96 Harrison & Popke, supra note 91, at 950. 
 97 Day & Walker, supra note 91, at 16. See also Will Anderson et al., Coping 
with Low Incomes and Cold Homes, 49 ENERGY POL’Y 40, 40 (2012). 
 98 Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362; Reames, supra note 4, at 
550. 
 99 Reames, supra note 4, at 550. 
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who purchase warmth only at the expense of adequate diets 
or going short in other ways.100 
In the United States, experts often pinpoint the “energy 
burden” threshold for tipping into energy poverty as spending 
more than 6% of the household income on energy.101 Some of the 
poorest U.S. households spend 25 to 30% of their income on 
energy.102 In contrast, the median U.S. household spends around 
3.5% of its income on energy bills.103 
There is no national U.S. survey designed to specifically 
measure energy poverty;104 accordingly, estimates are hard to come 
by. The federally administered Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program (“LIHEAP”), which provides energy 
assistance to a portion of those households in need, determines 
eligibility by income alone, rather than energy burden.105 
According to the most recent LIHEAP data available, 38.5 million 
                                                
 100 Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362 (quoting Jonathan Bradshaw 
& Sandra Hutton, Social Policy Options and Fuel Poverty, 3 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
249 (1983)). 
 101 See Dan Boyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock, High Utility Costs Force Hard 
Decisions for the Poor, INSIDE ENERGY (May 8, 2016), 
http://insideenergy.org/2016/05/08/high-utility-costs-force-hard-decisions-for-
the-poor/; Adam Chandler, Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of 
Their Income on Energy, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2016/06/energy-poverty-low-income-households/486197/. In 
Europe, where energy is more expensive, the figure is often 10%. Sovacool, 
Fuel Poverty, supra note 87. 
 102 Boyce & Wirfs-Brock, supra note 101. 
 103 ARIEL DREHOBL & LAUREN ROSS, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
EFFICIENT ECON., LIFTING THE HIGH ENERGY BURDEN IN AMERICA’S LARGEST 
CITIES: HOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY CAN IMPROVE LOW INCOME AND 
UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES 4 (Apr. 2016), 
http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1602.pdf 
[hereinafter ACEEE REPORT]. 
 104 Hernández, supra note 87, at 153. 
 105 Off. of Cmty. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Low Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2014, v-
vi, 83, 45 n.2 (2014), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/fy14_liheap_rtc_final.pdf 
[hereinafter LIHEAP]. 
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U.S. households had incomes that qualified for home energy 
assistance under the federal income standard.106 Private data 
suggests that the “energy affordability gap” in the United States—
by which the authors mean the amount of money that Americans 
spend on energy above “affordable” energy bills107—was around 
$41 billion in 2015 (up from $18.2 billion in 2003).108 Additional 
research suggests that the disparity in energy burdens results in 
large part from the fact that low-income homes are less efficient, 
such that the poor spend more not only as a percentage of income 
but also on a per-square-foot basis.109 
Although some energy bill assistance is available to households 
in need, it comes nowhere close to meeting the “affordability gap” 
described above. In 2015, LIHEAP funds provided $3.3 billion in 
funding, reaching only 6.3 million of the 38.5 million federally 
eligible households, and covering only a portion of each of these 
household’s needs.110 A “scattering” of additional state programs—
typically funded by ratepayers and administered by utilities—helps 
                                                
 106 The federally qualifying income is 150% or less of federal poverty 
guidelines, although states are permitted to set more stringent standards. Id. at v. 
 107 “Affordability” is calculated using the 6% energy burden figure, but the 
authors do not report the total number of U.S. households whose utility spending 
rises above this percentage. Fisher Sheehan et al., What is the Home Energy 
Affordability Gap?, HOME ENERGY AFFORDABILITY GAP, 
http://www.homeenergyaffordabilitygap.com/01_whatIsHEAG2.html# (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 108 Id. 
 109 See ACEEE Report, supra note 103, at 4; see also ARIEL DREHOBL & 
LAUREN ROSS, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE US LOW-
INCOME ENERGY AFFORDABILITY LANDSCAPE: ALLEVIATING HIGH ENERGY 
BURDEN WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 2 (2016), 
http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2016/data/papers/11_326.pdf (finding that 
low-income households pay $1.41 per square foot, compared to a household 
average of $1.23 per square foot) [hereinafter ACEEE STUDY]. 
 110 LIHEAP, supra note 105, at vi (reporting that the average level of 
assistance was $366); see also FISHER SHEEHAN ET. AL., THE HOME ENERGY 
AFFORDABILITY GAP 2015 (2016), 
http://www.homeenergyaffordabilitygap.com/downloads/2015_Released_Apr16
/HEAG2015%20Regional%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf. 
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fill remaining needs in some states, but none come close to closing 
the gap.111 
Unsurprisingly, the concepts of “energy burdens” or an 
“affordability gap” fail to fully capture the lived experience of 
energy poverty.112 Consider the following accounts, all drawn from 
public testimony to the New York State Public Service 
Commission in 2016: 
John Washington, in Buffalo, NY: This system is designed 
to keep people poor, to keep them cold, to keep them 
unhealthy, and to keep them hungry. It is designed to 
transfer our public wealth to private institutions. You may 
disagree, but National Fuel and National Grid [two New 
York utility companies] are private institutions that pay 
their C.E.O.s millions of dollars. There is absolutely no 
reason, except for profit, that 800 million dollars of arrears 
exists [in New York State]. That should be immediately 
wiped out. . . . Last week, I had my lights cut off. My 
family slept in the dark for 2 days because I paid 6 dollars 
and 95 cents less than the program that I was in wanted. 
You don’t think I wanted to pay 6 dollars and 95 cents? 
You don’t think I wanted to do that? Have you ever slept in 
a dark apartment? Have you ever had your child ask you 
why can’t the lights go on? I have a 3-year-old. He doesn’t 
                                                
 111 Meg Power, Fuel Poverty in the USA: The Overview and the Outlook, 98 
ENERGY ACTION 1 (Mar. 2006) (“Simple price discounts for vulnerable 
households identified by a service agency remain the preferred tool for 
sympathetic regulators; in some states this is supplemented by modest 
investment in programmes of energy advice and/or guidance on other sources of 
assistance and managing household budgets.”); see also ACEEE REPORT, supra 
note 103, at 27–28; ACEEE STUDY, supra note 109, at 1. 
 112 Conor Harrison, The Historical–Geographical Construction of Power: 
Electricity in Eastern North Carolina, 18 LOC. ENV’T. 469, 471 (2013) (“[I]t is 
not only expensive electricity that leads to energy poverty, rather it results from 
a range of factors and relationships, including the sources and types of 
household energy, the energy efficiency of a given home, and the unique 
circumstances individuals and groups face in order to stay comfortable in their 
home.”). See infra Part IV for a more robust description of one state’s 
programs—New York. 
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understand this. . . . All he wants to do is watch cartoons 
with his dad. But his dad couldn’t pay 6.95, so he’s got to 
cry himself to sleep. I want you to think about that.113 
Dawn Rounds, in Buffalo, NY: But with the bills, the 
only thing we have to support ourselves with is his military 
pension, and my bills keep getting higher and higher, and I 
don’t know should I buy food, his medicine, her medicine, 
pay the bills? I go to HEAP [LIHEAP], but HEAP for 
electric doesn’t even start until January. I need the electric 
to turn my heater on. Many times I’ve had the electric shut 
off until I could get help and we’d have no heat or electric. 
We struggle every day. I’m always behind. Borrow from 
Peter to pay Paul. We’ve been living where we are now for 
about eight years, and it’s just getting harder and harder. 
We got a little bit of extra income for my granddaughter, 
but because of the extra income, our food stamps went 
down and my rent went up.114 
Zakiyyah Salahuddin, in Poughkeepsie, NY: Have you 
ever been cold and frozen inside your house? It’s colder 
than the freezer. You see your breath. Your lungs get 
messed up. You start deteriorating. I sleep in my car for the 
past four years, yeah, ‘cause it’s warmer. I can put on the 
heat then. And in the day I get in, wash and do whatever I 
have to do.115 
                                                
 113 Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to 
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public 
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 42–
43 (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 p.m.) (statement of John Washington, Buffalo transcript). 
 114 Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to 
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public 
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 22 
(Oct. 1, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Dawn Rounds, Buffalo transcript). 
 115 Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to 
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public 
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 35 
(Sept. 24, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Zakiyyah Salahuddin, Poughkeepsie 
transcript). 
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Deborah May, in Poughkeepsie, NY: I got a call a few 
months ago from an undesirable place, I won’t name it, and 
I went over there, and they were happy to have me, and I 
said well, let me talk to some of the people who live here 
first, and I talked to about ten people there, and they all told 
me the same story: You think it’s cheap to live here, but be 
ready to wear your winter coat inside all year, because if 
you have the heat on, you will be paying as much as for 
electric as you are for rent. And everybody told me the 
same thing. Now, I know it’s hearsay, but I’m telling you 
that’s what they told me. And I realized I can’t even afford 
public housing? I mean, that’s the cheapest thing you can 
get and I can’t even afford that because of the added cost 
of electricity. So I’m feeling really stuck.116 
Suwany Westney, in New York City, NY: I’m on a 
fixed income also, I get SSI and SSD. And in 2014, I got a 
bill for three thousand dollars, and they—when I asked 
them, they said they read the meter wrong, and they took 
off like two thousand off the bill. But ever since then, I’ve 
been backed up, and I’m on the budget payment. . . . And I 
called them and said I cannot afford to pay the seven 
hundred dollar bill, I was willing to pay four hundred 
dollars and try to work on something like that. They said 
no, and from that they turned off my lights.117 
Much better than statistical accounts, these testimonials help 
illustrate the frustrations and humiliations that arise from the ways 
in which electricity law, and in particular utility rate regulation, 
interacts with poverty in the United States. More remains to be 
done to connect such lived experiences to policy discussions, but 
important work exists in this direction. Recent research has added 
                                                
 116 Id. at 42–43 (statement of Deborah May, Poughkeepsie transcript) (on file 
with author). 
 117 Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to 
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public 
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 49 
(Oct. 13, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Suwany Westney, New York transcript) 
(on file with author). 
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sociological and historical depth to the concept of energy poverty 
by describing the ways in which these statistics interact with 
housing infrastructure and urban settlement patterns,118 as well as 
the ways in which the economics of electricity influenced its 
geographical spread and contributed to current patterns of energy 
poverty.119 For example, Diana Hernández charts disparate pockets 
of energy poverty in Detroit, where “almost 27 percent of low-
income households fell behind on utility payments and an 
additional seven percent experienced a utility shut-off [following 
the Great Recession].”120 Hernández links these disparate rates with 
race and class, finding that: 
Blacks were almost twice as likely as non-blacks to report 
being behind on utilities payments (41% versus 22%) and over 
three times more likely to experience a utility service shut-off than 
non-blacks (15% versus 4%). Low (38%) and moderate-income 
(32%) groups were disproportionately more likely to be behind on 
utilities payments as well as to experience a shut-off (14% and 5%, 
respectively) compared to higher income households in each 
category (14% and 2%, respectively).121 
These more nuanced emerging accounts of energy poverty help 
answer certain questions often asked of those researching the topic: 
Why should we focus on this aspect of poverty, to the exclusion of 
others? What’s the use in addressing energy poverty separately 
from the general problems of poverty or inequality plaguing the 
United States? This Article’s intention is not to promote energy 
poverty to a place of primacy above the other challenges of 
poverty in the United States. But it remains a useful disaggregated 
measure for purposes of energy law because energy regulators play 
a particular role both in creating the problem and in responding to 
it. 
                                                
 118 See Reames, supra note 4; Diana Hernández & Stephen Bird, Energy 
Burden and the Need for Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy, 2 
POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5, 10 (Nov. 2010). 
 119 See Harrison, supra note 112 (exploring the “historical–geographical 
foundations of energy poverty” in Eastern North Carolina). 
 120 Hernández, supra note 87, at 151. 
 121 Id. 
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To understand why, Connor Harrison’s historical examination 
of energy poverty in North Carolina proves illuminating. Harrison 
paints a scene of significant disparities in the price of electricity 
across various Eastern North Carolina cities and towns and 
explains these disparities largely in terms of the history of 
electrification.122 Electricity came to rural North Carolina “as part 
of a state-led modernisation effort aimed at a particular type of 
progress during the early and middle parts of the twentieth 
century.”123 This state-led effort resulted in the formation of rural 
electric cooperatives, whose economics only made sense if 
consumption patterns were sufficiently high to justify the building 
of transmission lines.124 Consequently, the leaders of rural 
electrification efforts viewed their objective as not only providing 
access to electricity but also as “build[ing] up the psychology of 
generous use of electricity.”125 Thus, energy regulators put in place 
policies aimed at encouraging households to use increasing 
quantities of electricity—the same quantities that now threaten the 
stability of successive generations of these households.126 
None of this history suggests energy poverty is any more 
pressing of an issue than the housing crisis, or hunger and food 
insecurity. What it does suggest is that the problem of energy 
poverty is at least in part structurally created by the legal 
frameworks governing electricity consumption.127 And it is 
influenced not only by human agents, but also by the physical 
                                                
 122 Harrison, supra note 112, at 479. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See id.; see also Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34 (on the 
history of electrification and its economic as well as social drivers). 
 125 Harrison, supra note 112, at 479 (quoting Morris Cooke, an early leader of 
the Rural Electrification Administration). 
 126 See id. at 480. Harrison goes on to describe the ways in which investment 
in nuclear power caused rates to rise particularly rapidly for households tied to 
publicly owned utilities, exacerbating the problem of their high levels of 
consumption. See id. at 482–84. 
 127 Cf. id. at 484 (“If the high electricity bills and high electricity consumption 
of the energy poor are to be put in their historic and geographic contexts, so 
must the actions of the state and the electric utilities that helped produce 
them.”). 
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infrastructure that has been built to accommodate widespread 
interconnection and consumption.128 Because this is the case, the 
radical re-examination of electricity law’s governing frameworks 
presents an opportunity to reconsider how regulators making 
infrastructure decisions can either exacerbate or mitigate the 
problem of energy poverty. Here is where grid modernization and 
energy poverty intersect. 
IV. ENERGY POVERTY & GRID MODERNIZATION IN 
CONVERSATION 
The personal accounts of energy poverty quoted above 
emerged out of New York’s REV proceedings. This final part tells 
the story of how the REV proceedings precipitated such a 
narrative-rich account of the problem of energy poverty and what 
regulators did in response. 
New York’s Public Service Commission (“the Commission”) 
launched the REV proceeding in April 2014 with a fairly 
standard—albeit ambitious—vision of grid modernization in mind: 
“to align electric utility practices and our regulatory paradigm with 
technological advances in information management and power 
generation and distribution.”129 REV aims to promote 
“improvements in system efficiency, greater customer choice, and 
greater penetration of clean generation and energy efficiency 
technologies,” by better aligning utility and customer incentives 
with regulatory goals.130 The crux of the strategy involves 
transforming utilities into engines for change by tying their earning 
incentives to their ability to draw consumer-side resources into a 
competitive marketplace.131 It is a deeply transformative—some 
                                                
 128 See Day & Walker, supra note 91, at 20. 
 129 NYPSC Order Instituting Proceeding, supra note 20, at 2. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n in Regard to Reforming the 
Energy Vision: Order Adopting Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy 
Framework, 329 P.U.R.4th 1, 3 (May 19, 2016) (Order adopting a ratemaking 
and utility revenue model policy framework). 
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have even said “wildly ambitious”132—plan for reform, and three 
years later, the Commission is still ironing out the details of how 
REV will proceed.133 
The Commission early on recognized that affordability would 
be a key concern in the REV proceedings.134 The Order Instituting 
Proceedings included this goal: “Maintain Commitment to 
Affordable Universal Service.”135 It readily became apparent to the 
Commission, however, that this aim would require more 
concentrated attention than REV’s implementing documents 
necessarily contemplated. Commenters quickly pushed the 
Commission in this direction, through both procedural and 
substantive arguments. Procedurally, several commenters urged the 
Commission to slow down implementation, to allow for greater 
citizen input and participation.136 Substantively, commenters called 
the Commission’s attention to the plight of low-income New 
Yorkers struggling to pay their electricity bills and insisted that 
REV include this perspective as it moved forward.137 
                                                
 132 David Roberts, New York Is Transforming Its Energy Systems. Meet the 
“Czar” in Charge., VOX (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:00 pm), http://www.vox.com/2015/ 
11/20/9769856/new-york-kauffman-interview. 
 133 See DPS—Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE, 
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA0
07DCFE2?OpenDocument (last updated Jan. 20, 2017). 
 134 NYPSC Order Instituting Proceeding, supra note 20, at 58–59. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Letter from Beth Finkel, AARP & Russ Haven, NYPIRG, Pub. Util. Law 
Project of N.Y., to the Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n 5 (July 18, 2014); see Letter from David Hepinstall, Exec. Director, & 
Valerie Strauss, Director of Pol’y & Reg. Affs., Ass’n for Energy Affordability, 
Inc. (AEA), to the Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
(July 18, 2014). 
 137 Letter from Beth Finkel & Russ Haven, Pub. Util. Law Project of N.Y., to 
the Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n 5 (July 17, 
2014). See also Letter from Nat. Res. Def. Council et al., to the Honorable 
Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n (July 18, 2014); Letter from 
David Hepinstall, Exec. Director, & Valerie Strauss, Director of Pol’y & Reg. 
Affs., Ass’n for Energy Affordability, Inc. (AEA), to the Honorable Kathleen 
Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n (July 18, 2014). 
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The Commission responded to these concerns by launching a 
separate “Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine 
Programs to Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility 
Customers” in January 2015.138 The Order began by recognizing 
the long-standing but piecemeal nature of low-income protections 
in New York electricity law.139 It declared the “primary purpose” of 
the proceeding was to “standardize utility low income programs to 
reflect best practices[,]” and directed Commission staff to provide 
a report with recommendations to this effect.140 Note here how the 
Commission’s language suggested a separation between issues of 
affordability and the primary goals of REV—a point the Article 
returns to below. 
Commission Staff provided the requested report on June 1, 
2015.141 The statistics presented in the report are sobering: the 
Commission found that over one million New York households 
(out of a total of around 8.2 million142) were in arrears on their 
utility bills and owed a total of around $800 million to utilities.143 
In the previous year, almost 300,000 New Yorker households had 
utility service disconnected for non-payment.144 In terms of “energy 
burdens,” Staff calculated that New Yorkers around the federal 
poverty level spent between 15 and 22% of their income on 
energy, and those at less than 50% of the federal poverty level 
spent 41% (whereas “middle and higher income customers 
                                                
 138 Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to Examine Programs to Address 
Energy Affordability for Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565 (Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter NY Order Instituting Low 
Income Proceeding]. 
 139 Id. at 2. 
 140 Id. at 4–5. 
 141 See STAFF REPORT, PROCEEDING OF THE COMM’N TO EXAMINE PROGRAMS 
TO ADDRESS ENERGY AFFORDABILITY FOR LOW INCOME UTILITY CUSTOMERS, 
N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, No. 14-M-0565 (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter NYPSC 
Low-Income Staff Report]. 
 142 QuickFacts, US CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ 
table/HSG010215/36 (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (New York). 
 143 NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 4. Total New York 
state population is 19.25 million. 
 144 Id. 
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experience energy costs in the general area of one to five 
percent”).145 In terms of bill assistance, Staff found that “New 
York’s current low income affordability programs provide[d] an 
average annual benefit of roughly 10% of a residential customers’ 
total utility bill”—amounting to around $227 for those who 
received gas and electric assistance.146 
Staff noted wide disagreement on how to redesign low income 
programs,147 but ultimately recommended a tiered system of 
benefits, tying the level of assistance received to specific income 
levels, so as to better target energy poverty by providing larger 
discounts for those most in need.148 Staff further suggested that 
programs should be aimed at reducing energy burdens to 6%,149 
“with an overall increase in statewide program budgets of about 
46%.”150 
A group of thirty-four “bitterly disappointed” organizations 
and elected officials offered two major criticisms of this 
proposal.151 First, they suggested it did not do nearly enough to 
widen the net of those eligible for energy poverty assistance, as 
Staff pegged eligibility for the state programs to receipt of federal 
energy assistance.152 According to the groups calculations, the 
proposal would thereby “lock out the 50-70% of low-income New 
Yorkers who are eligible for HEAP, but do not actually receive 
it.”153 At the same time, the group was one of many calling for the 
Commission to give considerably more thought to how to integrate 
low-income affordability and the broader goals of the REV 
proceeding, by providing more funding for low-income efficiency 
                                                
 145 Id. at 5. 
 146 Id. at 29. 
 147 Id. at 30. 
 148 NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 31–41. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 34. 
 151 Group Comment submitted by Alliance for a Green Economy on 
Proceeding of the Comm’n to Examine Programs to Address Energy 
Affordability for Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 
14-M-0565, at 2 (Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Group Response]. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 3. 
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programs and considering creative new solutions: for example, by 
“allow[ing] low-income discount recipients to redirect their 
discounts into shared renewable energy projects, giving low-
income people a choice in where their electricity comes from and 
reducing their utility costs.”154 
At the same time, other groups pushed the Commission to do 
more to hear and understand the concerns of those directly 
experiencing energy poverty. In particular, groups requested more 
hearings on the low-income affordability proceedings, held at 
locations throughout the state.155 The Commission responded by 
scheduling additional hearings throughout the state, resulting in a 
total of twelve public hearing statements at which—as the 
Commission noted in its final order: 
[M]ore than 100 speakers offered statements on the Staff 
Report, generating nearly 600 pages of transcript. Many of 
the speakers were low income electric and natural gas 
customers, who testified to the difficulties that they have 
                                                
 154 Id. at 4. See also Public Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The Motion Of 
The Comm’n To Examine Programs To Address Energy Affordability For Low 
Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 5 (Oct. 
21, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Richard Berkley, Albany transcript) (“Only 
37 percent of [households meeting the current criteria for utility assistance] in 
Albany County would be eligible for low-income energy assistance under the 
Staff’s initial proposal”). See also NYPSC Comments to Low Income Staff 
Report, supra note 27, at 3–4; Public Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The 
Motion Of The Comm’n To Examine Programs To Address Energy 
Affordability For Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 
14-M-0565, at 61 (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 p.m.) (statement of Maloney De Zuldivar, 
Buffalo 2 transcript) (“And it has been mentioned multiple times, but the issue 
of root causes, you say you’re only going to talk about discounts. Well, I know a 
lot of people in the low- income communities that would be more than happy to 
use the money that they get on discounts and put that to a shared renewable 
facility. Invest in solar. Invest in the much needed home repairs and 
weatherization.”). 
 155 Letter from Richard Berkley, Exec. Director, Pub. Util. Law Project of 
N.Y., to The Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, at 1 
(Sept. 25, 2015) (on file with author). 
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faced paying for service, and the need to improve energy 
affordability for the poorest New Yorkers.156 
It is these personal accounts that appear in the section above on 
energy poverty. 
These hearings appear to have had a substantial impact on the 
Commission’s course of action. The Commission’s May 2016 
Final Order took two significant steps. First, it expanded state low-
income bill assistance programs considerably, aiming for a 
program that caps the energy burden of all households in New 
York at 6 percent.157 To do so, it increased ratepayer funding of 
such programs by 87 percent.158 Second, despite having started the 
proceeding focused specifically on reform of low-income 
assistance programs, the Commission’s emphasis broadened 
considerably in its final order, observing: 
[T]he best solution for all customers, including low income, 
lies in facilitating opportunities to invest in clean energy 
and the means to reduce energy costs. Greater access and 
support for low income and underserved communities to 
DER [distributed energy resources] is the best way to 
narrow the affordability gap that needs to be filled with 
direct financial assistance for customers with low incomes. 
Greater access to advanced energy management products to 
increase efficiency for low income customers will empower 
those for whom these savings may have the greatest value, 
as well as allowing the most disadvantaged customers more 
choice in how they manage and consume energy.159 
The Commission’s Order goes on to detail several steps it is 
already taking to integrate programs to accomplish REV and 
                                                
 156 Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to Examine Programs to Address 
Energy Affordability for Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, 2016 WL 3018703, at 7 (May 19, 2016) [hereinafter 
NY Low Income Order]. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 16. The Commission also called for further inquiry into how to 
expand eligibility beyond current LIHEAP recipients, but did not make final 
recommendations on this point. See id. 
 159 Id. at 10. 
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address energy poverty simultaneously, and it makes a 
commitment to further integrate these issues in later phases of the 
REV proceeding.160 
It is too early to suggest that New York’s Commission has 
cracked the nut of how to affirmatively include low-income 
consumers in grid modernization efforts. But it is, at least, taking 
steps towards concrete proposals—with a particular focus on 
including low-income consumers in New York’s new efforts to 
promote “community distributed generation” (“CDG”).161 CDG 
allows customers to contract for the right to either own or purchase 
electricity from larger, community-scale distributed generation 
systems, eliminating the need for an appropriate private rooftop to 
install small-scale renewable energy.162 The Commission’s first 
step towards ensuring the participation of low-income customers in 
CDG was to establish a “collaborative” in 2015 to “identify 
barriers to low-income customer participation in Community DG 
projects and the mechanisms necessary to remove those barriers,” 
through a process involving relevant stakeholders.163 That 
collaborative resulted in a series of working groups and culminated 
in a report issued in August 2016, which identifies numerous 
strategies for creating CDG efforts that include substantial 
numbers of low-income subscribers.164 These strategies range from 
innovative financing arrangements to make participation in CDG 
more attainable for low-income customers,165 to state mandates or 
                                                
 160 Id. at 24. 
 161 See NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 2. 
 162 See id. For those projects where community members do not take direct 
ownership, “subscriptions can be structured as a power purchase agreement 
(PPA), lease, or loan.” Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n as to the Policies, Requirements 
and Conditions for Implementing a Community Net Metering Programs, N.Y. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 15-E-0082 (Summary of the Collaborative Working 
Group Reports Regarding Community Distributed Generation for Low-Income 
Customers) (Aug. 15, 2016) [hereinafter NY Solar Working Group Report]. 
 165 “Most parties agreed that the major barriers to low-income customer 
participation in Community DG projects are the upfront cost of the subscription 
and customers’ low credit scores that prevent outside financing.” NY Solar 
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goals regarding the number of low-income subscribers either 
particular projects or the program as a whole should obtain, to 
incentive programs targeted specifically at low-income 
customers.166 
In a contemporaneous August 2016 Status Report, Commission 
Staff expressed what reads as at least latent frustration with the 
outcomes of this collaborative, explaining: “Although, the 
Collaborative spent a great deal of time and effort investigating the 
barriers to low-income customer participation in CDG projects, 
workable solutions have not arisen that would overcome those 
barriers.”167 Accordingly, staff decided to end the collaborative and 
produce a staff white paper recommending next steps, which has 
yet to be published.168 Presumably, more specific solutions—
including potentially permitting utility ownership of CDG projects 
targeting low-income consumers169—will be forthcoming in that 
white paper. 
It remains important, however, not to focus exclusively on the 
(relatively) glamorous option of “solar panels for all.” Often, 
programs that focus on strategic cutting of demand, or smarter 
targeting of traditional energy efficiency, may better serve low-
income groups and the grid as a whole. To that end, New York’s 
Commission is also piloting an effort to allow New York City’s 
utility, ConEdison (ConEd), to develop a project focused on 
strategies beyond CDG. In the company’s Brownsville Project, 
ConEd is developing substantial consumer-side solutions to delay 
the need to build expensive sub-transmission infrastructure.170 The 
                                                                                                         
Working Group Report, supra note 164, at 6. To address these challenges, the 
Working Group recommended that: “Working in cooperation with Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) or directly with NY Green Bank, 
banks could extend credit to a project sponsored for low-income households for 
the purpose of subscribing to a Community DG project.” Id. at 9. 
 166 See id. at 37–39; NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 6. 
 167 See NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 12. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. at 13. 
 170 See Order Establishing Brooklyn/Queens Demand Management Program, 
No. 14-E-0302, at 1–5 (N.Y.P.S.C., Dec. 12, 2014) (approving the acquisition of 
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project will take place in a high demand, densely residential, low-
income area of Brooklyn and Queens with an above average 
proportion of renters as compared to owners.171 Using geo-targeted 
data to identify pockets of high peak energy use, ConEd will 
provide local residents with energy efficiency, demand 
management, distributed generation, apartment complex 
microgrids, and “other innovative solutions.”172 ConEd estimates 
that the cost of the demand-side solutions will be approximately 
$200 million, whereas the traditional transmission solution would 
have cost ratepayers $1 billion.173 As a result, the Commission has 
agreed to allow ConEd to recover most of the costs of the program 
from its ratepayers, and has given the company several additional 
incentives.174 
There are a few important points to note about New York’s 
process and outcome. First, one thing that advocates of grid 
modernization often point out when confronted with questions 
about its distributive consequences is, “What distributive 
consequences? The whole point of grid modernization is it ideally 
will make everyone’s bills go down!” This aspiration, standing 
alone, is true enough: many analyses suggest that when done 
properly and robustly, grid modernization could in fact reduce 
overall grid costs and reduce bills across the board.175 But it is 
important to understand that this assertion of an eventual hopeful 
conclusion does little to assuage the doubts of those who feel the 
current system is failing them miserably. They need something far 
more than the promise of an eventual minor decrease in electricity 
                                                                                                         
41 megawatts of consumer-side solutions) [hereinafter Demand Management 
Program Order]. 
 171 Rebecca Craft, Con Edison’s Use of Targeted Demand-Side Resources, 
Presentation to the National Regulatory Research Institute (Feb. 26, 2015). 
 172 See Demand Management Program Order, supra note 170, at 4; Craft, 
supra note 171. 
 173 Demand Management Program Order, supra note 170, at 19. 
 174 Id. at 21 (describing additional incentives in the form of a regulated return 
of investment, a 10-year amortization period, and opportunities to increase the 
return on equity by achieving certain milestones). 
 175 See supra note 46. 
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bills.176 The moment of system re-design opens up the opportunity 
for a conversation about how governance reforms might not only 
modernize the grid and bring down costs as a general matter, but 
also do a better job addressing those whom the current system 
under-serves.177 New York’s commission took seriously the 
concerns over how energy poverty and grid modernization 
interrelate, rather than brushing these aside as irrelevant to a 
proceeding that aimed to reduce overall system costs, over the long 
term. In doing so, it came to see considerable potential to address 
the two issues synergistically, rather than treating them as separate 
policy challenges. 
Second, there is a procedural as well as substantive lesson to be 
learned from New York’s experience: the Commission responded 
to the request of those affected by energy poverty to be heard. It is 
hard to gauge the extent to which this impacted the ultimate 
outcome of the Commission regarding integrating energy poverty 
and grid modernization and increasing funding levels. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that it made some impact, given the 
movement one can see between the Commission’s opening of the 
                                                
 176 See, e.g., Group Response, supra note 151 (asserting that current programs 
“are entirely inadequate to stem the rising number of shutoffs and arrears in 
New York. . . . When utility service is shut off because people cannot afford 
their bills this mandate is not being met. For many New Yorkers, utility service 
is neither reliable, nor are the rates just and reasonable.”). See also Public 
Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The Motion Of The Commission To 
Examine Programs To Address Energy Affordability For Low Income Utility 
Customers, No. 14-M-0565, at 11 (N.Y.P.S.C., Oct. 21, 2015, 3:00 p.m.) 
(statement of Russ Haven, Albany 2 transcript) (“Across the board, in all areas, 
including this part of the state, there was concern about how REV would affect 
utility bills. This can and must mean that consumer ratepayers, particularly low- 
and moderate-income New Yorkers, end up paying less for electric in the REV 
marketplace than in the current system we have now.”). 
 177 “Under-serves,” at least in the sense that many cannot afford basic utility 
service. Whether or not the state should in fact provide such service to them at 
discounted rates remains, of course, a matter of substantial academic and 
practical debate. But it is hard to quibble with the assertion that electricity is a 
pretty basic need at this point in our country, even if one disagrees with whether 
or not the state should help provide for it. 
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proceeding and the outcomes of its final order.178 At the same time, 
it likely served a cathartic function for those who participated, 
helping to increase the perceived legitimacy of the Commission’s 
ultimate decision.179 
V. NAVIGATING THE TENSIONS 
What is to be learned from New York’s experience? There are 
obvious epistemological limits to case studies. What mattered in 
New York may not matter in other states, as the social context, 
interested parties, and governing law may all differ. These 
challenges offer real impediments to generalization. Yet New 
York’s experience at least serves as a bellwether of tensions likely 
to arise in other states, for several reasons. For one, New York is 
out ahead of the rest of the country in terms of the magnitude of its 
contemplated changes in electricity regulation, but not for long. 
Several states are following its lead,180 and many more are likely to 
be forced into similar conversations by the sheer scale of structural 
and technological changes confronting the electricity industry.181 
Moreover, although New York’s particular solutions to the 
                                                
 178 See supra note 156. 
 179 See Public Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The Motion Of The 
Commission To Examine Programs To Address Energy Affordability For Low 
Income Utility Customers, No. 14-M-0565, at 7 (N.Y.P.S.C., Oct. 21, 2015, 
3:00 p.m.) (statement of NYPIRG, Albany 2 transcript) (testimony from 
representative of New York Public Interest Research Group that “NYPIRG was 
among several groups to emphasize to Department staff . . . the central 
importance to REV of consumer protections and affordability issues. We were 
pleased that the staff clearly heard these concerns. As a result, Chair Zibelman 
in turn established regular meetings with the groups and personally met several 
times to discuss affordability and consumer protection concerns.”). See 
generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule 
of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283. See also Sovacool & Dworkin, Energy Justice, 
supra note 19, at 437 (positing a procedural component to energy justice, contra 
projects proceeding “with exclusionary forms of decision-making that lack due 
process and representation”). 
 180 See supra note 21. 
 181 See Peter Kind, Edison Elec. Inst., Disruptive Challenges: Financial 
Implications and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business 6–9 
(Jan. 2013). 
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problem may strike some as particularly “progressive” and thus 
limited to areas of deep blue shading on electoral maps, neither its 
governance structure nor the challenge it faced is unique: energy 
poverty is a pervasive problem across states, and all states use 
public utility law to determine how to apportion costs of the grid 
among end-use customers.182 Thus, it is likely that as large-scale 
grid modernization proceedings unfold across the country, 
regulators in all states will be asked to seriously re-engage with the 
problem of energy poverty as part and parcel of the push for a 
more sophisticated, cleaner grid. Early anecdotal evidence bolsters 
this prediction: California’s Commission, another state at the 
forefront of modernization efforts, has also engaged in substantial 
discussion about the relationship between energy poverty and rate 
re-design.183 Similarly, as the European Union has proceeded on its 
path towards robust decarbonization, the topic of energy poverty 
has emerged as a significant flash point.184 
There is not space in this brief article to analyze whether New 
York’s response is the best response to such tensions, or how well 
                                                
 182 This statement slightly oversimplifies the case — in the case of the few 
states that have moved fully to “retail choice,” public utility law plays a more 
limited role. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 57 (describing the three types of 
state utility regulation). However, even in states that have moved to competitive 
retail electricity markets, the historic utility often continues to serve most 
customers as the “provider of last resort,” such that in practice these states’ 
structural challenges in confronting energy poverty are more similar to 
traditional states than may appear at first blush. 
 183 See NY Solar Working Group Report, supra note 164, at 19 (describing 
California’s efforts in this regard); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12894 (S.B. 535, 
2011–12 Regular Session (Cal. 2012) (adopted Sept. 30. 2012)) (requiring that 
twenty-five percent of revenues from the State’s carbon dioxide cap-and-trade 
auctions go to projects that benefit identified disadvantaged communities); 
Distributed Generation & Distributed Energy Res., D. 06-01-024, 2006 WL 
162584, 5, 39–40 (Cal. P.U.C., Jan. 12, 2006) (interim order). 
 184 Hiteva, supra note 89, at 487 (“The heightened interest in fuel poverty and 
vulnerability in Europe is taking place in the background of a low-carbon energy 
transition within the European Union.”). See also Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra 
note 87, at 361 (describing the United Kingdom’s Warm Front Home Energy 
Efficiency Scheme, which “removed about 2.36 million English households 
from fuel poverty” between 2000 and 2013). 
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it would work in other states. Instead, the article aims to draw out 
New York’s experience to underscore both a more preliminary and 
broader point: the conversation about how to modernize the grid 
cannot—as a practical and political endeavor—afford to ignore 
either the uncomfortable challenges or substantial ameliorative 
possibilities that the project of redesigning electricity governance 
and the electricity grid raises for those in energy poverty. 
On this point, this article has at moments in this article framed 
energy poverty as an “impediment” to grid modernization, and it 
certainly can be. In one way, the two issues form a discordant 
pairing. But another way to view the increasingly interwoven 
nature of these two projects is as an opportunity for reaffirming 
energy law’s core commitments in a new era. The fact that 
regulators in New York took energy poverty seriously—and 
responded substantially to the stories they heard of its effects on 
state residents—suggests that regulators there view REV as more 
than just a project of finally perfecting the efficiency of the grid.185 
Instead, both the re-airing of the problem of energy poverty and the 
wholesale re-examination of current electricity governance 
structures form part of single, larger project: that of building a 
more sustainable, just society, from the grid up. 
                                                
 185 Cf. supra Part II (describing the ways in which grid modernization would 
finally bring to fruition the dreams of many energy economists). 
